The paper sets out to understand the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers in the face of change. To capture the dynamics of the doctrine we turn to a Machiavelli inspired conflict-centered view of politics and proceed to analyze conflict as a Schelling-style mixed-motive game, proposing that constitutional law generates focal points that endogenously shift the lines of power. These arguments are made with empirical support from our previous work centered on the Indian Constitution, which aimed to pinpoint economic costs that are traceable to the violation of separation of powers. To understand constitutional law as a focal point as well as the argument that such focal points themselves end up re-ordering the legal order, we work with a conception of law that draws on the work of legal institutionalists in particular homing in on the formulation of law suggested by the Italian jurist Santi Romano. In effect, the paper highlights a set of narratives that tease out patterns, which are read as Schelling style mixed motive games, but this is not the only point of the paper, rather through this telling it aims to present a method of approaching an institutional analysis of separation of powers – it suggests a replication of such analysis in the many instances where the separation of powers is in operation to see the many variegated outcomes.